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Abstract 
 
This paper takes Alexis de TocTXHYLOOH¶VFRQFHUQZith the emotional life of citizens as 
a cue for exploring WKH UROHRIFROOHFWLYHPHPRU\ZLWKLQ µWKHVHOI-organizing VSKHUH¶ 
and asking how the invocation of memory affects progress towards democracy. The 
paper hones in on the Brazilian experience, re-assessing %UD]LO¶VDPQHVLDFSDVWDV
ZHOO DV LWVPXFK ODXGHG µWXUQ WRPHPRU\¶ Against FRPPRQDVVHUWLRQV WKDW%UD]LO¶V
µWXUQWRPHPRU\¶ZLOOHQKDQFHWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHPRFUDWLFFUHGHQWLDOVWKLVSDSHUDUJXHV
WKDWWKHPRYHIURPDQµDEVHQW¶WRDµSUHVHQW¶SDVWLQ%UD]LOLn fact bodes rather mixed 
prospects for WKHFRXQWU\¶V democratic deepening. 
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 3 
Introduction 
'XULQJ %UD]LO¶V SHULRG RI PLOLWDU\ UXOH (1964-1985), social struggles were heavily 
repressed. Thousands of alleged dissidents were imprisoned and/or harassed by 
SROLFH PDQ\ ZHUH H[LOHG DQG KXQGUHGV ZHUH LOOHJDOO\ H[HFXWHG %UD]LO¶V PLOLWDU\
period was characterised by extra-constitutional decrees, arbitrary implementation of 
the rule of law and high levels of police violence. Despite harrowing tales of torture, 
intimidation and oppression of oppositional voices, HVWDEOLVKLQJDµFXOWXUHRIPHPRU\¶
relating to %UD]LO¶Vdictatorship years has been a slow and rather uncertain process. 
Whilst neighboring Argentina established its National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons shortly after the collapse of the military regime in 1983 
and Chile created the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation immediately 
after the return to civilian rule in 1990, successive Brazilian governments avoided 
WDNLQJPHDVXUHVWRFRPHWRWHUPVZLWKWKHFRXQWU\¶VDXWKRULWDULDQSDVWSince 2005 
however, there has been a notable turnaround in official state discourse. The 
Federal Government, under the leadership of the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(Workers Party or PT), has actively promoted a new culture of memory around the 
dictatorship years. It has argued WKDWWKHQHZPHPRU\SROLWLFVLVDQµHSLORJXHWRWKH
GHPRFUDWLF WUDQVLWLRQ¶ $PRULP  KDVWHQLQJ %UD]LO¶V progress towards 
democratic consolidation. But is this really the case? What does the existing wisdom 
tell us and how is this borne out in the Brazilian example? This paper aims to tackle 
these questions and more.  
Despite a raft of scholarship from the liberal tradition suggesting that a strong civil 
society presence facilitates progress towards democratic deepening, to date there 
has been little extensive discussion of collective memory as one of the factors linking 
associational forms to political outcomes. In order to address this gap, the paper first 
revisits and connects scholarly works from the traditions of civil society and social 
memory studies. By weaving together the fragments of existing wisdom from these 
two traditions, the paper not only disrupts dominant Neo-Tocquevillean accounts that 
largely neglect the ideational, emotional and normative substance of civil society, it 
also proffers that when actors within civil society are pressed to remember, the 
consequences for democracy may be quite varied. With this in mind, the paper then 
moves on to explore and apply pressure to claims WKDW%UD]LO¶VµWXUQWRPHPRU\¶ZLOO
enhance the counWU\¶V democratic credentials. It concludes that the shift from an 
µDEVHQW¶ WR D µSUHVHQW¶ SDVW LQ %UD]LO LQ IDFW KROGV UDWKHU XQFHUWDLQ SURVSHFWV IRU
democratic deepening. 
On civic association and democratic deepening: Tocqueville revisited 
In recent decades there has been a surge of academic interest in the broad range of 
social institutions and associational forms that operate outside the confines of the 
state. Drawing on the works of Alexis de Tocqueville and Antonio Gramsci amongst 
others, academics from both liberal and critical traditions have attributed value to the 
H[LVWHQFHRIDµVHOI-RUJDQLVLQJVSKHUH¶,QERWKWUDGLWLRQVFLYLOVRFLHW\LVDVVXPHGWR
constitute a crucial check on governmental power. Scholars drawing on the 
Gramscian tradition have underlined how civil society operates as the site of 
bourgeois dominance and counter-hegemonic struggle (Kumar 1993; Cox 1999; 
Anheier et al. 2001). However, the liberal view which elevates the relationship 
EHWZHHQGHQVHDVVRFLDWLRQDO IRUPVDQG µGHPRFUDWLFdeepeQLQJ¶ has been far more 
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influential among political officials and institutions, informing policy prescriptions from 
national and international centres of power. For this reason, the paper deals 
exclusively with civil society discourses in the liberal tradition, and in particular the 
work of the )UHQFKDULVWRFUDW$OH[LVGH7RFTXHYLOOH7RFTXHYLOOH¶V WUDYHORJXHV IURP
his journey to the United States drew links between the interactions that occur within 
private associations and democratic stability. Although Tocqueville probably 
overstated the exceptionality of the American system and its democratic credentials, 
his insights were nonetheless valuable. His early 19th Century observations of 
American political culture led him believe that forms of voluntary association and 
sociable interaction amongst men [sic] were what could prevent democratic societies 
from descending into a chaos born of egoism, greed and disorder of the human soul.  
 
In fact, in ToFTXHYLOOH¶VSHUVRQDOOHWWHUV, he showed a great concern for the emotional 
VXEVWDQFHRISROLWLFDODQGVRFLDO OLIHFODLPLQJ WKDW µVWDWHVZHUHQRWGHILQHGE\ WKHLU
laws, but rather from their origins by the feelings, thought processes, ideas, hearts 
and mindV RI WKHLU LQKDELWDQWV¶ OHWWHU GDWHG  2FWREHU , cited by Hoffman 
2006). Moreover, in some correspondence he appears to lament the growing 
primacy of scientific reason, suggesting that, µ[w]hat one meets with least frequently 
in these days are true and lasting passions, influencing and directing the whole 
OLIH«'RXEWDQGSKLODQWKURS\PDNHXVVKULQNIURPDOODFWLRQZKHWKHUIRUWKHSXUSRVH
of effecting great good or great evil; and we are always languidly engaged in the 
pursuit of trifles, none of whicKUHDOO\DWWUDFWUHSHOXVRUIL[XV¶de Tocqueville: letter 
to M. J. J. Ampère, dated 1841). 
 
In the twentieth century, Robert Putnam brought Tocquevillean ideas back into the 
IROGZLWKKLVFODLPWKDW µGHPRFUDF\LVVWUHQJWKHQHGQRWZHDNHQHGZKHQLWIDFHVD
YLJRURXV FLYLO VRFLHW\¶ 3XWQDP  and that Civil Society Organizations 
&62¶V couOG SOD\ D PDMRU UROH LQ EXLOGLQJ FLWL]HQVKLS VNLOOV 3XWQDP¶V OLEHUDO
contemporaries concurred:  
«DQ DEXQGDQW VWRFN RI VRFLDO FDSLWDO LV SUHVXPDEO\ ZKDW
produces a dense civil society, which in turn has been almost 
universally seen as a necessary condition for modern liberal 
democracy... If such a political system is not to degenerate into 
anarchy, the society that subsists in that protected sphere must 
be capable of organising itself (Fukuyama 2001:7). 
In the post Cold War context, neo-Tocquevillean ideas became particularly influential 
as political theorists and policymakers sought out models to democratize states 
µEURXJKWLQIURPWKHFROG¶7oday, references to civil society have become an almost 
obligatory insert for policy discussions and reports relating to development and 
GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ 7KH :RUOG %DQN  FODLPV IRU LQVWDQFH WKDW  µ[it] has 
learned through these three decades of interaction that the participation of [&62¶V] in 
government development projects and programs can enhance their operational 
performance by contributing local knowledge, providing technical expertise, and 
leveraging social capital.  Further, CSOs can bring innovative ideas and solutions, as 
ZHOO DVSDUWLFLSDWRU\DSSURDFKHV WR VROYLQJ ORFDOSUREOHPV¶ ,Q WXUQ86$,' 14) 
argues that a vibrant civil society is a necessary requirement for a democratic 
political culture.  
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However, the overriding emphasis in neo-Tocquevillean liberalism is on the presence 
DQG GHQVLW\ RI DVVRFLDWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ WKH VXEVWDQFH RI WKHP 3XWQDP¶V µ%RZOLQJ
$ORQH¶ IRU H[DPSOH uses membership of choral societies, football clubs and other 
associations as a proxy for an organized reciprocity that is in turn treated as a 
precondition for socioeconomic modernisation and democracy. He bemoans the 
GHFOLQH LQ DVVRFLDWLRQDO PHPEHUVKLSV VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW $PHULFDQV RXJKW WR µGR
VRPHWKLQJ¶ WR VWDOO WKH UHVXOWLQJ µGHPRFUDWLF GLVDUUD\¶ 3XWQDP  µ+LJK RQ
America's agenda should be the question of how to reverse these adverse trends in 
VRFLDO FRQQHFWHGQHVV WKXV UHVWRULQJ FLYLF HQJDJHPHQW DQG FLYLF WUXVW¶ 3XWQDP
'LVFRXQWLQJ7RFTXHYLOOH¶VRZQKLVWRUico-cultural sensibility and concern for 
the emotional substance of civil society, these works tend to reduce the relationship 
between civil society and democracy to a numbers game that is broadly replicable in 
any context.  
Of course, the very nature of democratic political culture is a source of contestation. 
There remains a good deal of debate surrounding the relative pros and cons of 
procedural versus substantive variants of democracy and there is considerable 
disagreement over the point at which a country might be considered to have 
consolidated its democracy. Definitions offered by so-FDOOHG µPLQLPDOLVWV¶ VXJJHVW
that democracy can be considered consolidated when formal legal institutions such 
as universal suffrage, freedom of speech and association exist in parallel with 
sequential unimpeded national elections. The problem with this approach however is 
that the presence of legal and formal institutions do not often provide any kind of 
guarantee against forms of corruption and exclusion stemming from entrenched 
socio-economic inequalities and patterns of dominance (Schatz and Gutierrez 
Rexach 2002). Rather, there is a wide range of attitudinal, institutional and 
procedural requirements that must be met for democracy to be considered 
consROLGDWHG2¶'RQQHOO6FKHGOHU:LWKWKLVLQPLQGEncarnación (2003; 
2014) has developed a definition which attends to some of the weaknesses of more 
shallow models. For him, three things in particular are seen as suggesting a high 
level of overall quality of democracy: (1) civilian control of the military; (2) adherence 
to a broad menu of civil rights and political liberties; and (3) widespread acceptance 
of democracy by the citizenry as the best form of government: in other words, 
³GHPRFUDWLFOHJLWLPDF\´¶(Encarnación 2014:45).  
Using this definition, Encarnación (2003) finds that the empirical evidence on the 
democratizing power of a dense associational landscape at the national level is by 
no means conclusive. A close reading of national experiences in Europe, for 
example, does not really support the liberal claim. When comparing Britain, France, 
the Netherlands and Belgium with those states that descended into communism, 
IDVFLVP FRUSRUDWLVP DQG RWKHU SROLWLFDO µHYLOV¶ LQ WKH HDUO\ WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ µWKH
particulars of the constitution of domestic civil society proved to be a poor indicator 
IRU SUHGLFWLQJ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI GHPRFUDF\¶ Encarnación 2003:5). As he points 
out, countries like Germany and Italy had some of the densest civil societies in the 
late nineteenth century but found it challenging to build enduring democratic 
institutions as they moved into the next century. As Bemeo and Nord (2000:xvi) 
state, µQRW DOO FLYLO VRFLHWLHV KRZHYHU GHQVH DQG YLEUDQW JLYH ELUWK WR GHPRFUDWLF
SROLWLHV¶  
Furthermore, dense associational landscapes at the domestic level do not appear 
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FRQVLVWHQWO\DVSUHFXUVRUVWRWKHGHPLVHRIDXWKRULWDULDQUHJLPHV+XQWLQJWRQ¶VµWKLUG
ZDYH RI GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ¶ EHJLQQLQJ LQ WKH ODWH V DQG FXOPLQDWLQJ ZLWK WKH
spectacular collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, conceals a huge diversity of 
GRPHVWLFUHVSRQVHVDQGYDU\LQJGHJUHHVRIFLYLFSUHVVXUHIRUFKDQJHµ7KHVSDWHRI
new democracies born out of this democratic revolution demonstrates that a stable 
democratic public life can in fact be attained when lacking most of the conditions 
usually attached to a vibrant and robust civil VRFLHW\¶ Encarnación 2003:16). 
Moreover, while it is true that some publics engaged in widespread protests that 
ushered in new political systems, in several Latin American countries, the support of 
transnational activist networks was perhaps as important to discrediting the regimes 
as existing forms of domestic association (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  
These discrepancies highlight some decisive flaws in the neo-Tocquevillean formula. 
Firstly, it remains largely unclear as to just how civic association facilitates 
democratic deepening. Some liberal optimists offer platitudes about civic virtues -  
tolerance, civility, nonviolence and disposition toward the public good - that are 
thought to be enhanced when all parts of the public can organize effectively to 
communicate their views outside of state-controlled channels. But crucially as James 
Holston (2008:13) argues, a self-organizing demos can cement a particular regime of 
citizenship as well as contest it: µ«KXPDQ DJHQF\ DOVR SURGXFHV HQWUHQFKPHQW
persistence and inertia¶ which can of course stall progress towards better quality 
democracy.  
 
In some societies, non-state actors may be so dispersed or fragmented that 
governmental action or resources are needed to kick-start or add momentum to civil 
society organization. But many have quite rightly questioned whether the state can 
or should step in as a facilitator or benefactor of civil society, raising valid concerns 
that such relationships jeopardize the autonomy of non-state actors. Foley and 
(GZDUGVDOVRDVNµ[i]f, as some hold, civil society's chief virtue is its ability 
to act as an organized counterweight to the state, to what extent can this happen 
ZLWKRXW WKH KHOS RI SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV DQG H[SUHVVO\ SROLWLFDO PRYHPHQWV"¶ Thus, 
related to the question of how civic association leads to democratic deepening is the 
question of what civil society is: What kinds of actors does it include and exclude? 
Where do its boundaries lie? In the sense that civil society is frequently defined by 
what it is not - the government - all manner of alliances and institutions might be 
considered under its banner. In the broadest definitions, the media industries, the 
market and corporations can be said to belong to civil society, alongside criminal 
networks and gangs. But then we might well be inclined to ask why associational 
networks should be disposed toward inclusivity, civility and the public good at all.  
 
The point to be made is that there are of course no automatic links between the 
presence of dense organizational networks and the democratic credentials of a 
nation. As Waisman, Feinburg and Zamosc (2006:1) suggest, despite the 
UHVXUJHQFHRILQWHUHVWLQGH7RFTXHYLOOH¶VZRUNWKHµVSHFLILFSURFHVVHVWKDWOLQNFLYLO
society and politics have not been conceptualized with precisLRQ¶6RFLDO VFLHQWLVWV
should be prepared to investigate these processes; asking for example, whether 
dominant thought processes, ideas and connective practices within the self-
organizing sphere are attuned to and indeed compatible with democratic 
imperatives. If so, how and in what ways? In this sense, rather more important than 
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the mere presence of forms of civic association, are what Tocqueville himself 
originally described in terms of WKH µVHQWLPHQWV DQG LGHDV¶ WKDW UHQHZ WKHPVHOYHV
through reciprocal action of men [sic] upon each other. In other words, the emotional 
and ideational substance that animates civil society networks and informs their 
activities.  
Collective memory, civil society and democracy  
The term µcollective memory¶ was coined by the French sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs in his publication, La Mémoire Collective (1950). In his writing, 
Halbwachs explored the nature and constitution of individual memories, arguing that 
all individual memory was constructed within social structures and institutions such 
as the family, organization, and the nation-state. This insight has provided a point of 
departure for a range of interesting works exploring the foundational make-up of 
groups, communities and nations. $V .DQVWHLQHU  VWDWHV µ[c]ollective 
PHPRU\ LV QRW KLVWRU\ WKRXJK LW LV VRPHWLPHV PDGH IURP VLPLODU PDWHULDO¶
Communities of all sizes and types invoke stories, cultural artifacts, traditions and 
music in order to preserve a certain continuity and connection with the past. 
Crucially, these collectively valued objects and representations work to preserve and 
foment group unity or association. Collective memory may be thought of as the glue 
that binds civil society and its constitutive elements. Yet somewhat curiously, the 
phenomenon of collective memory is often absent in discussions about civil society 
and its democratising propensities. In the section that follows, I review some key 
interventions from the field of collective memory with the aim of illuminating just how 
collective memory animates civil society and influences progress towards 
democracy. 
Collective or cultural memory to some degree determines what kinds of political 
ideas and practices become dominant in civil society. According to Mohtashemi and 
Mui (2003) for example, collective memory is a strong source of connectivity and 
knowledge within networks of friends and social groupings. It provides a foundation 
upon which to draw when making decisions about how and when to act in an 
altruistic manner. Collective memory, then, helps determine the scope of who or 
ZKDW JURXSV DUH µGHVHUYLQJ¶ RI RXU FKDULWDEOH JLYLQJ DQG RWKHU extensions of civic 
practice. Collective memory is heavily bound up with national and group identity. 
Habashi (2013) offers one strong example in the oral story-telling practices of 
Palestinian children. She shows how such practices serve to underline feelings of 
FRPPXQLW\ XQLW\ DQG FRQWLQXLW\ 6KH XQGHUOLQHV WKH ZD\V LQ ZKLFK FKLOGUHQ¶V
recollection of historical narratives alongside their own experiences as refugees in 
fact transforms the national narrative, enabling them to become co-authors of 
collective memory. Indeed, collective memory may be considered a crucial source of 
group identification and solidarity as individuals can appeal to shared experiences 
and understandings in order to negotiate and build a sense of history, place and 
belonging. Therefore, it frequently provides a benchmark and impetus for collective 
claim-making practices which act as a check on governmental power. Moreover, 
where civil society groups have experienced a democratic system in which their 
actions contribute to a broader architecture of accountability and representation, that 
experience may help sustain the stability of this political system.  
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Rallying against $JQHV+HOOHU¶V suggestion that modern civil society lacks collective 
or cultural memory (Heller 2001), a number of scholars have forcefully argued that 
memory is gaining an ever stronger presence in art, literature and political discourse. 
Olick (1998) and Huyssen (2000; 2011) are amongst those who observe a significant 
shift away from the future-orientation of modernist and high modernist projects of the 
earlier twentieth century, towards a contemporary µPHPRU\ ERRP¶ WKDW DWWDFKHV 
value to shared processes of recollection. But what has caused this shift? Olick 
(1998) highlights that the growth of scholarly and societal interest in memory has in 
part followed on from global political developments, including the increase in redress 
and reparation claims which can be traced back to the universal impact of the 
Holocaust and the Nuremburg trials. Huyssen (2000) however, offers some 
alternative ideas, arguing that WKHPRYH IURP µSUHVHQW IXWXUHV¶ WR µSUHVHQWSDVWV¶ is 
driven by processes of globalisation and has both an historical and a 
phenomenological dimension. On the one hand, recovering distinct memories can be 
seen as a step in the process of decolonisation as it opens up history for previously 
marginalised groups, making them owners and producers of social knowledge. This 
seems like an inherently democratic process. On the other hand, the turn towards 
memory can be seen as a reaction to globalisation in which cultures, communities 
and nations grapple for some kind of anchoring in a world transformed by dizzying 
transnational flows and densities of information. This is where things begin to get 
complicated for democracy.  
As Misztal (2010) suggests, globalisation pulls us in opposite directions and raises 
the question of what we ought to remember in the new global age. The issue is that 
globalisation processes entice us to forget the local and national identities that have 
stabilised the Westphalian system so as to make way for the emergence of new 
global connections. In the wake of this decoupling of nation and identity in the some 
social forces have pushed ever harder to reclaim and protect national symbols, 
customs and languages. For example, scholars Hamber and Wilson (2002) highlight 
the preponderance of nationalist discourse in the recent literature on truth 
commissions. Following Michael Ignatieff, they claim that although truth commissions 
may provide a useful platform for civil society groups to initiate an ongoing dialogue 
DERXWWKHSDVWWKHSURFHVVHVWKHPVHOYHVDUHRIWHQFORDNHGLQFODLPVDERXWµKHDOLQJ
WKHQDWLRQ¶E\IRPHQWLQJDFRPPRQVLQJXODUDQd shared memory of a troubled past. 
The extent to which supplanting one dominant memory with another can improve the 
stability of the political system is questionable. This is not in the least because the 
PHPRU\ FDQ µFXW ERWK ZD\V¶ SURPRWLQJ FORVXUH DQG Kealing in society or creating 
new chasms, cleavages and animosities by advancing the experiences of a 
particular group.  
It is perhaps no wonder then that some political philosophers have promoted 
collective forgetting as a pre-condition for a new polity. The works of Rawls and 
Hobbes provide precedents for a kind of ³GHPRFUDWLFIRUJHWWLQJ´ that allowed society 
to start afresh without inherited resentments. Some of these arguments are borne 
RXW LQ(QFDUQDFLyQ¶VDemocracy without Justice in Spain. In this study, the author 
offers a detailed overview of Spanish history since the civil war. Encarnación 
(2014:187) stresses the uniqueness of Spain as a country that has encouraged a 
politics of forgetting in order to create and solidify its democratic institutions. He 
argues that the Spanish example offers strong evidence to the power of forgetting 
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and underlines that, µcoming to terms with the past is not as static or formulaic a 
process as the transitional justice movement would suggest¶. As Misztal (2005:1326) 
summarises, sometimes forgetting is a necessity. This is because,   
[p]reoccupation with memory of the past injustices could easily 
lead to sociDO FRQIOLFWV EHFDXVH LW HQKDQFHV µWKH FROOHFWLYH
QDUFLVVLVPRIPLQRUGLIIHUHQFHV¶ WKDWIRUPV µWKHEDVLVRI feelings 
RI VWUDQJHUV DQG KRVWLOLW\¶ EHWZHHQ SHRSOH«*URXSV WKDW WXUQ
toward their past to glorify specific aspects of it and demand a 
recognition of suffering risk allowing collective memory to be 
used as a political instrument that legitimises myths and 
nationalist propaganda. Such fascination with memory might 
become an obstacle to democracy because groups compete for 
recognition of suffering, undermining the democratic spirit of 
cooperation.   
The dynamism of history and the incongruity between past and present social 
conditions are what allow collective memory to evolve, but the ever-present gap 
between what was and what is remembered makes collective memory susceptible to 
instrumentalism. Hence, Paul Ricouer (2004) suggests that memory might be thrice 
used and abused: it may be stymied, forced or manipulated for ideological purposes. 
He argues that in the latter is the most disquieting of abuses. This is because 
ideology and interest remains masked with the invocation of collective memory: 
Memory can be ideologized through the resources of the 
YDULDWLRQV RIIHUHG E\ WKH ZRUN RI QDUUDWLYH FRQILJXUDWLRQ« WKH
means of a clever strategy, consisting from the outset in a 
strategy of forgetting as much as in a strategy of 
UHPHPEHULQJ«$WWKLVOHYHORIDSSHDUDQFH imposed memory is 
DUPHGZLWKDKLVWRU\WKDWLVLWVHOIµDXWKRULVHG¶WKHRIILFLDOKLVWRU\
the publicly learned and celebrated. (Ricoeur 2004:85) 
He also warns, that all cues for remembering should be probed to reveal their 
omissions: in prompting us to remember something particular, what do they 
simultaneously encourage us to forget? Such cues should also be critically evaluated 
in light of whose interests they promote and whether they do indeed foster the 
realisation of democratic expression and civic will.  
Taken together, these debates suggest that collective memory can be a source of 
strength and integration for civil society but there is no guarantee that the invocation 
of collective memory will enhance the civic virtues anticipated by liberal theorists. 
Appeals to collective memory may well be important for building unity, solidarity, 
sense of place and purpose but we should also be sensitive to the violence done by 
projects that seek to homogenise distinct recollections, especially when such 
projects harbour interests that run counter to the goals of freedom and equality. It is 
crucial to note that collective memory is itself the site of strategic action, where 
interests may be pursued in contradistinction to democratic outcomes. The sections 
that follow endeavour to demonstrate the relevance of some of these insights in the 
Brazilian case.  
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Brazil: from ditadura to distensão 
During the period of military rule in Brazil, social struggles were heavily repressed, 
thousands of alleged dissidents were imprisoned or harassed by police, many were 
exiled and a number estimated in the hundreds were illegally executed. Yet, Brazil 
has been far slower to address its military past than neighbouring states, leading 
VRPH VFKRODUV WR GHVFULEH WKH FRXQWU\ DV D µUHJLRQDO RXWOLHU¶ $WHQFLR 2014) and 
RWKHUVWRLGHQWLI\DSHUYDVLYHµFXOWXUHRIDPQHVLD¶6FKQHLGHU2011) that has affected 
the nation. Collective remembering is only possible to the extent that events and 
processes from the past are revisited and publicly validated through representative 
DQG FRPPXQLFDWLYH SUDFWLFHV ZLWKLQ VRFLHW\ ,QGHHG µour impressions yield to the 
forms that social OLIH LPSRVHVRQ WKHP¶ +Dlbwachs 1992:49). This section reviews 
existing scholarship and identifies a range of pressures to close down on the 
FROOHFWLYHPHPRU\RIYLROHQFHDQGDWURFLWLHVFRPPLWWHGGXULQJ%UD]LO¶VDXWKRULWDULDQ
period, including: the regime¶V DELOLW\ WR WDS LQWR QDWLRQDO SULGH by usurping the 
PHPRU\ RI %UD]LO¶V µunfulfilled promise¶, a strong degree of complicity from the 
mainstream media, and a strategic continuismo WKDW FKDUDFWHULVHG WKH FRXQWU\¶V
process of transition. 
2014 marked the 50th anniversary of the coup which ousted the democratically 
elected president João Goulart in 1964. On the 22nd of March of that year, over a 
PLOOLRQ %UD]LOLDQ FLWL]HQV SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ WKH µ0DUFK RI WKH )DPLO\ ZLWK *RG¶ D
demonstration against GoularW¶V SURSRVHG VRFLDO UHIRUPV DQG WKH VXSSRVHG
communist threat to the nation. Not all of the marchers had favored a coup. Yet, the 
demonstration lent a semblance of popular support to the operation that followed 
shortly thereafter, installing a military regime that would last for 21 years, the longest 
in modern Latin American history. Upon seizing power, the self-VW\OHG µ6XSUHPH
&RPPDQG RI WKH 5HYROXWLRQ¶ VHW DERXW LQVWLWXWLQJ D VHULHV RI Atos Institucionais 
(Institutional Acts or AIs) reducing the civil service, suspending political rights and 
establishing a bogus two-party system that prevented the direct election of 
presidents and governors ± a measure designed to offer a thin veneer of democratic 
legitimacy. 
Although each of the six military administrations were implicated in the abuse of 
power through institutionalised torture and arbitrary arrest, General Emílio 
Garrastazu Medici presided over the most violent period of rule between 1969 and 
1974. Dubbed the µHUD GRV GHVDSDUDFLGRV¶ (era of the disappeared) at least 170 
DOOHJHG RSSRQHQWV DUH VDLG WR KDYH EHHQ NLOOHG GXULQJ 0HGLFL¶V WLPH LQ RIILFH DQG
many more were tortured in army and police cells. Whilst sanctioning extreme levels 
of violence to reign in alleged militants, Medici doubled as an economic virtuoso, 
overseeing a booming economy that achieved growth rates of over 10% a year. 
Moreover, the construction of the Trans-Amazonian Highway and the world's largest 
hydroelectric dam in the Rio Paraná, at Itaipu were lauded by the Medici 
administration as opportunities to lift the hinterland out of poverty and consolidate 
mastery over the intractable rainforest. Although several campaign groups tried to 
raise the profile of indigenous groups that were displaced or killed to make way for 
these large-scale µmodernizing¶projects (McDonald 1993), the economic successes 
of the military republic pacified many sectors of Brazilian society and tapped into 
dormant hopes that Brazil would finally emerge as the 'country of the future' 
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envisioned by Stephan Zweig in 1941. Eakin (1998) and others elaborate on the idea 
of an µXQIXOILOOHG SURPLVH¶ that has long-permeated the Brazilian collective psyche 
DQGSROLWLFDOGLVFRXUVH LQVSLWHRI WKHFRXQWU\¶VPDVVLYHVL]HKuge population, rich 
FXOWXUHDQG LQFUHGLEOHDUUD\RIQDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV LW KDV UHPDLQHGD µVOHHSLQJJLDQW¶
unable to mobilize its strengths to emerge as a world power.  
Finding another clever way to tap into this aspect of national discomfiture, the Medici 
government successfully FORDNHG LWVHOI LQ WKH JORU\ RI WKH %UD]LO¶V :RUOG &XS
victory. Medici declared a national holiday to acknowledge celebrations taking place 
on the streets. His office distributed posters that featured the footballer Pele scoring 
a goal and the slogan, µNinguem segura mais este pais¶ (Nobody can stop this 
country now). Others read µPra Frente Brasil¶ (Forward Brazil). Skidmore (1988) 
describes this DV D µEUHDG DQG FLUFXVHV VWUDWHJ\¶ designed to distract the povo 
(people or masses) from international criticisms of repression and turn Medici into a 
national hero. 
Rothstein (2000) underlines the strong influence of µLQIRUPDWLRQHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶, such 
as media gatekeepers and politicians RYHU ZKDW EHFRPHV UHJDUGHG DV µWUXWK¶ in 
society. )URPWKHWLPHRIWKHFRXSXQWLO%UD]LO¶VSHULRGRIRSHQLQJXSNQRZQDVWKH 
distensão (decompression), tKH PLOLWDU\ HVWDEOLVKPHQW¶V SURQRXQFHPHQWV DQG
UKHWRULFZHUHJLYHQFUHGHQFHDPSOLILFDWLRQDQGVXSSRUWE\PDQ\RI%UD]LO¶V ODUJHVW
news providers. 6WUDXEKDDU¶VHQWU\IRUWKH(QF\FORSHGLDRI7HOHYLVLRQFODLPVWKDWthe 
military governments saw televisual communication as a key tool for boosting 
nationalism, creating a broader consumer economy and controlling information. He 
continues: µThe military pushed television deeper into the population by subsidizing 
[sic] credit for set sales [and] by building national microwave and satellite distribution 
systems¶. Globo, Rede Record, O Estado de Sao Paulo, Folha de Sao Paulo, Jornal 
do Brasil and Correio da Manha have all at some point been implicated in providing 
a platform for the regime (Coelho 2013). TV Globo was founded the same year as 
the military coup and it became a privileged partner for the regime. Atencio (2014) 
describes some of the rewards Globo received for their loyalty including being 
permitted to pursue a joint venture with the Time-Life Corporation which cemented 
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VOHDGLQJPDUNHWSRVLWLRQDQGEURXJKWLWHQRUPRXVILQDQFLDOUHZDUGV  
Beginning in 1974 and culminating ZLWKGLUHFWSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQVLQ%UD]LO¶V
democratic transition was extremely protracted. Over this period, new political 
freedoms and higher levels of tolerance towards protesters were seen to emerge 
incrementally. In the early 1980s, as the country began to open up, there was 
FRQVLGHUDEOHFRYHUDJHRIWKHUHJLPH¶VDEXVHVRISRZHULQWKHPDLQVWUHDP%UD]LOLDQ
print media. The magazine Veja, for example, published several high-profile articles, 
including an exclusive interview with Amilcar Lobo, a doctor who assisted in torture 
sessions. With the Geisel administration easing up on press censorship, major 
newspapers and magazines catered to tKHSXEOLF¶V WKLUVW IRU LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH
GLFWDWRUVKLS¶VVHFUHWKXPDQULJKWVFULPHVWKURXJKFRYHUDJHRIWKHZDYHVRIUHWXUQLQJ
exiles, hunger strikes waged by the few remaining political prisoners. Yet, there was 
little to no parallel coverage on television, which was at the time dominated by the 
Globo network. In 1984, TV Globo initially supported the military government against 
the nationwide campaign for direct elections known as the Diretas-Ja movement. All 
in all, inconsistent - and sometimes really quite favorable - FRYHUDJHRIWKHUHJLPH¶V
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DFWLYLWLHVKHOSHGWRHQWUHQFKWKH LGHDWKDW WKHGLFWDWRUVKLSZDVFRPSDUDEO\ µVRIW¶ on 
its opponents.  
 
The Brazilian distensão also featured a range of carefully calculated gestures which 
variously called upon and regulated the collective memory of the nation. Important 
among these was Law 6,683, popularly known as the Amnesty Law. This law had 
come into force following a widespread campaign by the Brazilian Amnesty 
Committee (CBA, acronym in Portuguese), Women's Movement for Amnesty (MFPA, 
acronym in Portuguese), the student movement, as well as other pro-amnesty units 
inside and outside the country that called for the pardoning of activists, exiles and 
political prisoners. Although the campaign succeeded in getting a bill passed, the 
final version of the law, which came into force in 1979, FRYHUHGQRWRQO\WKHUHJLPH¶V
various opponents but also state torturers. As a result it provided lasting impunity for 
a great many of %UD]LO¶VPLOLWDU\DQGVHFXULW\RIILFHUV µIn the case of the dead and 
the disappeared, the law instituted a certificate of unknown whereabouts with 
presumed death which exempted the State from investigating the circumstances of 
the crimes or eveQWKHZKHUHDERXWVRIWKHERGLHV¶ (Teles 2006). Exploring a range of 
activist testimonies from the time, Atencio (2014) finds that a strong number 
favoured a strategy of conciliation with the regime. As a result, the µUHFLSURFDO¶
Amnesty Law was broadly accepted despite quite minimal concessions from the 
government. Schneider adds that dominant civil society groups rejected a more 
confrontational approach in favour of a general amnesty that would µreconcile the 
Brazilian family¶ (Schneider 2010; 2011).  
 
In a fascinating study, Rodeghero (2014) unpicks the metaphor of familial 
reconciliation in Brazil which she finds ubiquitous in interviews, correspondence, 
newspaper cuttings, pamphlets and manifestos from both 1945 - the end of the 
Estado Novo period - and 1979. Rodeghero (2014) finds clear parallels in the 
language used in 1945, when Getulio Vargas permitted the reintegration of political 
opponents, and the movement for political amnesty which mobilized between 1975-
79. She expands:  
 
The much talked about pacification or reconciliation of the 
Brazilian family, [is a] characteristic element of our political 
tradition, close to conciliation. Conciliation is part of a recurring 
trend in Brazilian political history of arrangements between the 
political elite whereby, according to José Honório Rodrigues, 
they have learned that it is the best strategy to avert popular 
participation and the claims of the "people" in situations of risk 
(Rodrigues, 1982). According to Renato Lemos, the tradition of 
amnesty during Brazilian history reflects "wider traditions: 
conciliation as a form of protecting the fundamental interests of 
the dominant classes in our society and that of preventive 
counter-revolution as an anti-crisis strategy"« 5RGHJKHUR 
2014). 
 
Effectively, Rodeghero identifies the strategy of conciliation as long-entrenched in 
the collective memory of the nation; a tradition or practice - hinged on forgetting - 
that has been recurrently called forth to deal with the political conflicts of the day. 
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Built into the Brazilian tradition of conciliation, is a pattern of advantage that 
consistently favours the interests of elites. Teles (2006) and others have lamented 
that, as Brazil opened up, µThe crimes of the dictatorship were simply no matter for 
GLVFXVVLRQQRWHYHQVRWKDWWKH\FRXOGEHREMHFWLYHO\IRUJLYHQ¶. ,Q5RGHJKHUR¶VZRUN
we get a glimpse of how collective memory can in fact limit the ambitions of popular 
movements and regulate ways of µdoing politics¶. This has a certain resonance with 
3DXO $PDU¶V recent work on µparastatal formations¶, which illuminates how civil 
society actors sometimes unwittingly come to perform the public functions of the 
state (Amar 2011).  
A wide range of authors including Mainwaring (1986); Linz and Stepan (1996) and 
Zaverucha (1994), Arturi (2001); Gugliano and Gallo (2013) have commented on the 
continuismo (continuities) that characterised the Brazilian democratic transition. 
Mainwaring (1986) for example explains the ouWJRLQJ UHJLPH¶V HQGHDYRXUV WR VSOLW
the emergent opposition into discordant factions. Meanwhile, Goes (2013) highlights 
that during the Constituent Assembly of 1988, most of the clauses that could have 
curtailed military impunity were skilfully and strategically omitted. Within the new 
civilian administration, military officials remained in positions of influence. Even the 
first civilian President, Jose Sarney, had long-standing connections to the outgoing 
regime, having previously led the government party ARENA.  
As $WHQFLRSRLQWVRXW µ%UD]LO¶VILUVWFLYLOLDQ3UHVLGHQWLQPRUHWKDQWZHQW\
years took no meaningful steps toward reckoning with such crimes during his 
administration; to the contrary, he made a practice of pointedly ignoring the 
questiRQ«¶. In the years following the IRUPDO WUDQVLWLRQ VHTXHQWLDO µ«GHPRFUDWLF
governments chose to confront the authoULWDULDQ SDVW WKURXJK DYRLGDQFH¶ (Goes 
2013:90), upholding an amnesty law designed to foreclose on calls for truth, justice 
and remembrance and repeatedly conceding to the demands and interests of the 
military establishment. Referring to the 1985 publication of Brasil: Nunca Mais, a 
book documenting 17,000 victims, and 1,800 torture episodes between 1964 and 
1979, Patrick Wilcken (2012:70) states:  
In any other context, a book like Brasil: Nunca Mais would have 
created ripple effects, as cases, names and methods were laid 
bare²not as loose, possibly politicized allegations, but in the 
black-and-white of court papers. But in post-dictatorship Brazil, 
not one of the 444 named torturers suffered any sanction, other 
than occasional harassment by campaign groups like Amnesty 
International. A large number continued working in police 
interrogation centres across the country, some indeed 
becoming the subject of more recent allegations of torture; most 
have ended up retiring on generous state pensions. 
The Brazilian experience from 1964 RIIHUV HYLGHQFH WR 5LFRXHU¶V FODLPV DERXW WKH
instrumentalization and abuse of memory. Here, the military, mainstream media and 
even the first civilian governments DUPHGWKHPVHOYHVZLWKDQµDXWKRUL]HG¶KLVWRU\WKDW
undersold the violence of the ditadura and spoke to the interests of the armed forces. 
Although there were some signs of progress, such as the creation of the Comissão 
da Anistia (Amnesty Commission) in 2001 to receive and investigate claims against 
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the military, as recently as February 2004, military pressure forced the government 
to obstruct a judgment ordering the opening of military files. Shortly thereafter, the 
government claimed that all records had been destroyed by the military in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  
Brazil: from distensão to fragmentação 
When compared to prior civilian governments, which have variously shirked, dodged 
and closed down on attempts to usurp the violent past, the sequential PT 
administrations since 2005 have been quite proactive. Under the leadership of Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, compensation for the families of the disappeared was extended. 
Da Silva also appointed Paulo Vannuchi, a former activist and dissident under the 
regime, to the position of Human Rights Minister; a move that caused discomfort 
within the military. In 2006 and 2009, Vannuchi led the Direito à verdade e à 
memória (Right of Memory and Truth) and the Memórias Reveladas (Revealed 
Memories) projects, which inaugurated exhibitions and monuments to those 
assassinated by the regime. In 2007, the Amnesty Commission extended its work, 
collaborating with trade unions, universities and faith groups across the country to 
initiate caravanas: local hearings that allow victims of repression the possibility of 
public acknowledgement, apology and reparation for the crimes of %UD]LO¶V
dictatorship. 8QGHU /XOD¶V OHDGHUVKLS the possibility of establishing a Truth 
Commission was publicly debated for the first time (Goes 2013). Later, Dilma 
5RXVVHII¶VSUHVLGHQF\ SUHVHQWHG DQ RSSRUWXQHPRPHQW IRU WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D7UXWK
Commission, with a president who was herself a victim of human rights violations 
under the military regime (Engstrom 2012). The former guerilla fighter, who was 
jailed and tortured under the military regime, first opened military records in 2011 
and then inaugurated %UD]LO¶V Comissão Nacional da Verdade (National Truth 
Commission or CNV) on May 10, 2013. High profile PT officials have claimed that 
WKH &19 LV D PDUN RI %UD]LO¶V PRGHUQ democratic character, signaling that the 
FRXQWU\ LV µQRZ VWDEOH HQRXJK WR VHHN WKH WUXWK IROORZLQJ D ORQJ VRXO-searching 
SURFHVV¶2JLHU%UD]LO¶VIRUPHU'HIHQVHMinister Celso Amorim, for example, 
has variously described the inauguration of the CNV and other truth projects as an 
µHSLORJXH WR WKHGHPRFUDWLF WUDQVLWLRQ¶ LELG, arguing WKDW WKH37¶V WXUQ WRPHPRU\
has strengthened democracy (Amorim 2011).  
 
So, why the shift in emphasis? On the one hand, many observers have linked the 
37¶V endeavors to resurrect and shift the parameters of collective memory to the 
personal experiences and interests of Da Silva, Rousseff and Vannuchi.  
7KHRULJLQVRIWKHQHZµSROLWLFVRIPHPRU\¶LQ%UD]LODUHSDUWLDOO\
rooted in the agents advancing this agenda. As union leader, 
Lula himself played a key role in opposing the military regime 
and in the process of democratization (Alves, 1985: 203, 209). 
VDULRXV PHPEHUV RI /XOD¶V JRYHUQPHQW ZHUH JXHUULOOD ILJKWHUV
RUVWXGHQWOHDGHUVZKRRSSRVHGWKHUHJLPH$FFRUGLQJWR0DULD
&HOLQD '¶$UDXғMR   SHU FHQW RI WKH PLQLVWHUV LQ /XOD¶V
WZRJRYHUQPHQWVKDYHµSROLWLFDOH[SHULHQFHLQWKHXQGHUJURXQG¶
such as clandestine opposition to the dictatorship. Vannuchi 
and Presidential Chief of Staff Dilma Rousseff both experienced 
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prison and torture (Schneider 2010:10) 
This explanation has been forceIXOO\ VHL]HG XSRQ E\ WKH 37¶V critics, who have 
accused the trio of enacting a vindictive policy programme against the right wing and 
military. A more compelling argument however, is that efforts to re-inscribe the 
FROOHFWLYH PHPRU\ VWHP IURP WKH 37¶V QRZ ZHOO-established practice of pragmatic 
government (Bremmer and Garman 2010), which in this instance seeks to balance 
an entrenched domestic reticence against DQµLQWHUQDWLRQDOORJLFRIDSSURSULDWHQHVV¶  
 
Checkel (1998; 1999) and others argue that state action is driven by rules of 
appropriate or exemplary behaviour. The pursuit of individual or national interest is 
often mediated by a need to µIXOILOWKHREOLJDWLRQVHQFDSVXODWHGLQDUROHDQLGHQWLW\
a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and 
expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, [state actors] do 
ZKDW WKH\VHHDVDSSURSULDWH IRU WKHPVHOYHV LQDVSHFLILF W\SHRIVLWXDWLRQ¶ (March 
and Olsen 2004:3). More to the point, VLQFH %UD]LO¶V UHWXUQ WR FLYLOLDQ UXOH
international observers have become increasingly attentive to the contradictions of 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VOHJDF\RI LPSXQLW\$PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO, the Inter American Court of 
Human Rights - /DWLQ$PHULFD¶VUHJLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVmechanism - and the former 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay are amongst those 
that have led calls for truth, justice and an end to impunity. In 2009 for example, 
Pillay claimed that the absence of debate around torture merely reaffirmed a legacy 
of legitimacy for authoritarianism.  
Brazil is the only country in South America not to have taken 
action to confront abuses committed during the period of military 
rule. While I recognize that this is a politically sensitive subject, 
there are ways of dealing with it which avoid reopening the 
wounds of the past and help to heal them instead. 
Torture, however, is an exception. International law is 
unequivocal: torture is a crime against humanity and cannot be 
left unpunished. The fact that the torture that took place in the 
military era has still not been dealt with by Brazil means that the 
proper, clear disincentives to commit torture now and in the 
future are not in place (Pillay 2009).  
 
The political costs of ignoring calls to confront the past are high for a state keen 
emerge as a global power and shed the µVOHHSLQJJLDQW¶ trope. And yet, due to the 
very particular characteristics of the dictadura and distensão explored in the 
preceding section, domestic civil society support for truth and justice initiatives has 
not always matched up to international demands. Although some organizations such 
as Tortura Nunca Mais, the Ordem Avocados Brasileiros (Brazilian Bar Association 
or OAB), the Frente de Esculacho Popular and Levante Popular da Juventude have 
worked tirelessly to raise the profile of victims and challenge the entrenched culture 
RI VLOHQFH DQG µXQUHPHPEHULQJ¶ LQ %UD]LO WKH\ KDYH IDFHG persistent denial or 
justification by a military institution that has retained high levels of popular support. 
Opinion polls from 2009, for example, suggested that up to 45% of the populace 
were opposed to the punishment of former police and military personnel found guilty 
of torture (DataFolha cited by Schneider 2011). 
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One of the most important achievements of the PT¶V WUXWK LQLWiatives has been the 
opening up of political space in Brazil. Through initiatives such as the caravanas, art 
exhibitions and most recently the CNV, the state has provided new spaces for 
discussion, debate and listening that allow previously marginalized actors and 
memories be amplified and legitimized. The testimony of retired army colonel Paulo 
Malhães to the CNV in 2014, for instance, confirmed that torture was institutionalized 
within the military state. Meirelles (2014) adds: µFor the first time a former army 
officer admitted the existence of centers of torture and that he worked at one of them 
± the so-FDOOHG ³+RXVH [of] 'HDWK´ Casa da Morte)¶. Moreover, as memories of 
torture have been revealed, they have prompted a re-examination of the present. In 
particular, the persistence of high levels of violence and impunity WKURXJKRXW%UD]LO¶V
criminal justice system have increasingly been called to attention by scholars, social 
movements, campaign groups and the media. As Wilcken (2012) summarizes, today 
³[t]KHUH LV D VWURQJ DUJXPHQW WKDW WKH SHUVLVWHQFH RI WRUWXUH WKURXJKRXW %UD]LO¶V
criminal justice system is a hangover from dictatorship-era structures and 
techniques. All that has changed are the targets: in place of the university-educated 
left-wing activists, who have long since rejoined the elite, are the marginais, or 
delinquents²overwhelmingly young, poor, black men picked up in favelas on petty 
drug charges´.  
 
Cognitive dissonance is the term psychologists use to describe the feeling of 
uncomfortable tension which comes from holding two conflicting thoughts in the mind 
at the same time (Evans 2015). The seeming contradiction of a governing party 
promoting an agenda of truth about past violences, whilst failing to deal 
comprehensively with ongoing police brutality was one of several issues brought into 
sharp relief in June 2013, when a few thousand demonstrators in Sao Paulo, led by 
the Movimento Passe Livre (Free Pass Movement) mounted an opposition to an 
impending rise in the cost of public transport. The police clamped down hard on the 
protestors, using a combination of teargas, pepper-spray, and rubber bullets to quell 
them. Yet, this only led to an escalation of contention. Upon witnessing the violence 
via their television sets and computers, µXS WR D PLOOLRQ SHRSOH DFURVV  FLWLHV¶
assembled on the streets (BBC 2013). They protested against the combination of 
poor public services, police violence and corruption all linked to planned sports 
mega-events ± the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.  
Whilst Brazil has seen many new social movements emerge in the last decade, 
many have been pre-occupied with identarian politics and have followed the 
horizontal mobilization patterns, anti-institutionalist and transnationalist tone of the 
earlier alter-globalization movement (Abers 2013). Whilst these elements were also 
present during the 2013 protests, anti-dictatorship slogans achieved a special 
prominence, with graffiti on the state security department building drawing explicit 
links to the dictatorship. Mollona (2014) posits that, µPerhaps in normal 
circumstances, the violence of the police might have passed unnoticed. But these 
heavy repressive measures coincided with the public debates on the military regime 
DQG RQ %UD]LO¶V XQILQLVKHG transition to democracy generated by the work of the 
National Commission of Truth (CNV)¶.  
However, contention around WKH37¶VPHPRU\ initiatives - particularly the CNV - also 
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reminds us that attempts to shift the terrain of collective memory can catalyze conflict 
and even unsettle the political system. In 2009, after Lula da Silva announced plans 
to set up a truth commission that would investigate crimes committed during the 
military dictatorships, the Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, and three leading military 
officials tendered their resignations. In the midst of this debate, popular magazines 
including Veja came out in defense of the military, describing the Human Rights 
0LQLVWHUDVD µPDGPDQ¶DQGHYHQ µD WHUURULVWZLWKDSHQ¶ 6FKQHLGHU µEven 
as the first stirrings of dissent within the government were being aired, the Minister of 
Defence Nelson Jobim, the Supreme Court judge Gilmar Mendes and, most 
FUXFLDOO\ WKH $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO¶V RIILFH ZHQW RQ WKH FRXQWHU-attack, vigorously 
defending the broadest possible interpretation of the Amnesty Law¶ (Wilcken 2012). 
Since then, resistance from the military and its right-wing support base in Brazil have 
not abated. Pressures from the military worked to curb the mandate of the proposed 
CNV, meaning that its early tone was conciliatory. A 2010 Supreme Court decision 
reaffirming the Amnesty Law also insulated former torturers against legal 
proceedings. Nonetheless, even as the CNV was underway in 2014, excavating 
histories of violence perpetrated against fellow citizens, over a thousand 
GHPRQVWUDWRUVPDUFKHG LQFLWLHVDFURVV%UD]LO LQD UHVWDJLQJRI WKH µ0DUFKRI
WKH)DPLO\ZLWK*RG¶WKHDFWLRQWKDWXVKHUHGLQWKHSHULRGRIPLOLWDU\UXOH  
This event was one among many organized in 2014 and 2015 by an increasingly 
vocal pro-dictatorship movement in Brazil. Tempered by allegations of corruption 
within the high ranks of the PT, plummeting public approval ratings for the governing 
party, high rates of unemployment, inflation and concerns over migrant flows, this 
movement has gained increasing momentum. Gatehouse (2014) observes a number 
of commemorative events that have been initiated or appropriated by the pro-military 
PRYHPHQW LQWHQWRQFHOHEUDWLQJWKHµDFKLHYHPHQWV¶RI WKHGLFWDWRUVKLS\HDUV7KHVH
include a mass held in Brasília as well as an event held in Congress where the ex-
soldier, now Congressman, Jair Bolsonaro released a banner reading 
µ&RQJUDWXODWLRQV WR WKH PLOLWDU\ VW  0DUFK   7KDQNV WR \RX %UD]LO LV QRW
&XED¶ *DWHKRXVH  ZDUQV WKDW LW LV QRW MXVW WKH PLOLWDU\ ZKR KDYH EHHQ
engaged in the defense of a collective memory broadly favorable  to the regime. In 
February 2014, Itaú%UD]LO¶VODUJHVWSULYDWHEDQNLVVXHGDFDOHQGDUSODQQHULQZKLFK
WKH VW RI 0DUFK ZDV ODEHOHG µDV µWKH DQQLYHUVDU\ RI WKH  UHYROXWLRQ¶ ± 
µUHYROXWLRQ¶ EHLQJ WKH SUHIHUUHG WHUP RI PHPEHUV RI WKH PLOLWDU\ DQG WKRVH 
V\PSDWKHWLFWRWKHGLFWDWRUVKLS¶2QHPRQWK ODWHUD/DZSURIHVVRUDW WKH8QLYHUVLW\
RI 6mR 3DXOR OHFWXUHG WKDW µWKH FRXS RFFXUUHG DW D WLPH ZKHQ ³OHIWLVW WRWDOLWDULDQ
VRFLDOLVPZDVVHHNLQJ WR WDNH WRWDOFRQWURORI%UD]LO´¶  *DWHKRXVH Following 
RRXVVHII¶VQDUURZUH-election in October 2014, about a thousand people mounted a 
demonstration on the main thoroughfare of the Avenida Paulista, Sao Paulo, calling 
for a military coup (SP247 2014). 
 
Based on 1,000 witness statements and 80 public hearings, the CNV released its 
final report in December 2014. It lists 377 µautores¶ (perpetrators) of human rights 
abuses, recommending that the Brazilian judiciary work to establish legal 
responsibility and not apply the 1979 Amnesty Law in relation to cases of torture. 
The report also called for institutional and legal reform of the Armed Forces and for 
them to take full institutional responsibility for atrocities committed. These 
recommendations have further ignited hostilities between the PT and the military¶V 
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support base. In 2015, conservative figures with backgrounds in the police or armed 
forces such as Moroni Torgan, Waldir Soares, Éder Mauro, Jair Bolsonaro and his 
son Eduardo used increasingly belligerent language against President Rousseff. 
Meanwhile, marches and demonstrations on the streets of São Paulo drew up to 
200,000 participants and called for: µFora Dilma¶ [Dilma out]; µFora PT¶ [PT out]. 
Amongst the crowds there some strong reactions encapsulated in banners reading: 
µo povo e soberano, intervenção militar não e crime¶ [the people are sovereign, 
military intervention is not a crime]; and, referring to the PT administration 
specifically, µporque não mataram todos em 1964?¶ >ZK\ ZHUHQ¶W WKH\ DOO NLOOHG LQ
1964?]. 
 
At the other end of the scale are expressions of discontent over concessions that the 
PT has made to the military. The Levante Popular da Juventude (Popular Youth 
Uprising) are amongst those &62¶V that have benefitted from the opening up of 
political space under the PT. The movement emerged around 2011, and became 
active campaigners for the formation of the Truth Commission. Yet, in the years since 
the inauguration of the CNV, the Levante Popular da Juventude have altered their 
tone and ambitions, calling ever more loudly for the revocation of the Amnesty Law 
and the trial of former officers. As Hamber and Wilson (2002:53) explain, truth 
commissions may well facilitate a common and shared memory, but a challenge is 
that individual and collective-institutional timelines and requirements for closure quite 
often diverge. We might find that: µTruth commissions do not heal the nation, restore 
the collective psyche or categorically deal with the past [«] They may >«@ cause 
further psychological trauma when individuals «are expected to advance at the 
same pace as the state institutions which are created in their name, but which are 
primarily pursuing a national political agenda¶.  
Prevalent among the actions of the Levante Popular da Juventude is a practice 
known as µHVFXODFKR¶.  Esculachos are µsomething between a march, an action or 
happening, and a public shaming¶ (Whitener 2009:21). Through localized 
demonstrations and performances, they identify torturers and officials of the 1964-
1985 military regime. In May 2011 for example, the group targeted the alleged 
torturer of Dilma Rousseff, VSUD\LQJ µ'LOPD¶V WRUWXUHU OLYHVKHUH¶ LQ UHGSaint on the 
pavement outside the home of former military official Maurício Lopes Lima. 
Esculacho or escrache (in Spanish) originated over two decades ago in Argentina 
when the campaign group HIJOS mobilized to denounce impunity for torturers and 
RIILFLDOV RI WKDW FRXQWU\¶V GLFWDWRUVKLS Escraches emerged at a juncture when 
criminal proceedings had stalled. They are widely are considered a form of µDo It 
Yourself¶ justice, but in Argentina at least, they have divided public and scholarly 
opinion. Whilst some have acknowledged the role of the Argentine escraches as a 
kind of catalyst ushering progress toward criminal trials for torturers, others have 
been rather more wary of the ways that these direct actions allow protestors to take 
matters into their own hands without fair trial or due process. Some have likened the 
Argentine escrache to a form of mob justice and vigilantism that has the potential to 
engender and escalate cycles of violence and retribution. As Russell (2014) 
highlights, although it is tempting to use existing Argentine ideas to inform the study 
of esculachos in Brazil, it would be wrong to simply transfer theoretical insights 
across from one case to the next. Although the contentious performances in Brazil 
are undoubtedly informed by the Argentine example, it is important to note that they 
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have emerged and evolved in a unique social and historical context. It remains to be 
seen exactly how the Brazilian esculacho, as a relatively recent manifestation, will 
interact with existing and evolving democratic and legal processes.  
 
Reflections  
This article had two closely related aims: i) to redirect analytical focus toward the 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ FROOHFWLYH PHPRU\ LQ WKH µVHOI RUJDQL]LQJ VSKHUH¶ DQGSROLWLFDO
outcomes; and, ii) to use insights gleaned from the marriage of civil society and 
social memory studies literatures as a guide to understanding the Brazilian 
experience. With these aims in mind, the first two parts of this paper sought to revisit 
and connect scholarly works from the traditions of civil society and social memory 
studies in order to explore the somewhat ambiguous relationship between collective 
memory, civil society and democracy. This theoretical excavation suggested that 
ZKHQDFWRUVLQFLYLOVRFLHW\DUHSUHVVHGRUSURPSWHGWRµUHPHPEHU¶SURJUHVVWRZDUG
democracy can be variously strengthened, disrupted or stalled. Crucially, what 
becomes collective memory, who promotes it, and when they do so, can all alter the 
prospects for democratic deepening. On the one hand, this tell us that numbers are 
not enough - ensuring a large or dense civil society does not guarantee progress 
toward democracy. On the other hand, it also provides grounds for questioning the 
37¶VFODLPWKDW%UD]LO¶VUHFHQWµWXUQWRPHPRU\¶LVDVXLWDEOHHSLORJXHWRWKHWUDQVLWLRQ
that will help to consolidate democracy in the country. 
The second half of this paper centred on the case of Brazil. E[SORUDWLRQVLQWR%UD]LO¶V
SURFHVVRI µIRUJHWWLQJ¶DQG LW¶V UHFHQWVWHSV WRZDUGV µUHPHPEHULQJ¶ UHYHDO collective 
memory as a site of on-going strategic action, where interests have been pursued, 
often in contradistinction to clearly defined democratic outcomes. A close reading of 
the Brazilian example suggests that in taking up calls to recover the past, the 
governing PT party has opened up democratic space and brought entrenched 
structures of violence to the forefront of public consciousness. However, there is also 
HYLGHQFHWKDWWKHµWXUQWRPHPRU\¶KDVDFFHOHUDWHGSURFHVVHVRISROLWLFDOIUDFWXUH or 
fragmentation in Brazil, with CSO¶s from across the political spectrum vying for 
different objectives and outcomes related to the CNV. Within this, the emergence of 
an increasingly vocal pro-dictatorship movement suggests that it may still be too 
early to claim an out and out victory for democracy in Brazil. To borrow from Linz and 
Stepan (1996): democracy is not yet µWKHRQO\JDPH LQWRZQ¶The recent growth of 
this movement suggests that establishing ³GHPRFUDWLF OHJLWLPDF\´ (Encarnación 
2003) is an ongoing challenge for the PT¶V OHDGHUVKLS and it remains unclear just 
how much - if at all - the CNV and related memory initiatives can boost public 
confidence in democracy. The record thus far is mixed at best and indicates that the 
VKLIW IURP DQ µDEVHQW¶ WR D µSUHVHQW¶ SDVW LQ %UD]LO KROGV DOWRJHWKHU uncertain 
prospects for further democratic deepening. 
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